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Abstract
We consider negotiations selecting one-dimensional policies. Individuals have
single-peaked preferences, and they are impatient. Decisions arise from a bargain-
ing game with random proposers and (super) majority approval, ranging from the
simple majority up to unanimity. The existence and uniqueness of stationary sub-
game perfect equilibrium is established, and its explicit characterization provided.
We supply an explicit formula to determine the unique alternative that prevails,
as impatience vanishes, for each majority. As an application, we examine the ef-
ficiency of majority rules. For symmetric distributions of peaks unanimity is the
unanimously preferred majority rule. For asymmetric populations rules maximizing
social surplus are characterized.
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1 Introduction
The genesis, efficiency and stability of democratic institutions are at the center of the
public debate. Recent historical developments - notably the emergence of new states after
the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and the constitutional construction of the European
Union - have fueled an intense debate on the links between political institutions and
welfare,1 and have renewed attention to the classical problems of constitutional design.
This paper contributes to the positive analysis of (super) majority rules with the
tools of bargaining theory. As remarked in the literature on bargaining in legislatures
initiated by Baron and Ferejohn (1989), collective decisions in democratic polities are
often the result of processes where bargaining and majority voting are combined. In this
paper we examine this type of negotiations under the assumption that policies must be
selected from a continuous one-dimensional set, where individuals have single-peaked and
concave utilities, and they are heterogeneous only in the locations of peaks. This simple
set up is a classical formulation in the social choice and political economy literatures.
Examples are the location of a facility, the election of a public official, the choice of
tax rates or minimum wages, or the budget allocated to a specific project. We assume
that decisions must be negotiated over time (individuals are impatient), and that the
approval of a (super) majority of the group is required for an agreement. Our aim is
to examine the outcomes of these negotiations, and to describe how they depend on a)
the demographics of the group, namely the number of individuals and the distribution of
individual preferences, and b) the institutions for consensus building, notably the size of
the (super)majority required to settle a choice.
Our main contribution is to provide a tractable model where the effects of demograph-
ical and institutional parameters over collective decisions can be described transparently.
1See, for example, Persson and Tabellini (2000), Persson (2002) and Aghion, Alesina and Trebbi
(2004).
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Our model delivers a unique equilibrium, and we provide its explicit characterization.
Hence, we supply a precise prediction for what alternatives prevail in negotiations under
each majority rule. This allows tractable comparative statics, which are the tool to ad-
dress a wide range of applications. The application that we explore in this paper examines
the efficiency of majority rules.
More precisely, our first contribution is a complete description of stationary subgame
perfect equilibrium2 outcomes under the standard random proposers protocol: At the
beginning of each round, an agent is selected at random to make a proposal which is
approved if it obtains the favorable vote of a (super) majority. Upon approval, the selected
alternative is implemented and the game ends. If the proposal is not approved, a new
round of bargaining begins in the following period. Under the assumption that individuals
are impatient, for each profile of peaks and each majority requirement, we explicitly
characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium in stationary strategies, and we show its
existence and uniqueness. The unique equilibrium is fully described by the approval set,
the (unique) subinterval of alternatives that are accepted by the required majority. The
size of this majority matters a lot in determining the approval set. We also identify
the unique limit equilibrium as players become infinitely patient. We establish that in
the limit the approval set shrinks to a unique alternative, and we supply the explicit
formula that determines this alternative. Thus, we supply a natural selection criterion to
select a single policy among the (potentially very large) set of equilibrium alternatives in
environments with infinitely patient individuals.3
A unique equilibrium induces a unique distribution of approved alternatives and unique
individual (expected) benefits for each majority rule. As an application, we can evaluate
the expected benefits that determine the players’ preferences over the different majority
2Henceforth equilibrium. The restriction to stationary strategies is standard in multilateral bargaining
games, as these games are known to have very large sets of subgame perfect equilibria.
3Banks and Duggan [2000] establish that every policy in the core of the voting rule is an equilibrium.
For supermajorities this is a full interval alternatives.
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requirements, and asses their efficiency properties. Very strong results apply for popu-
lations with a symmetric distribution of peaks. In these environments, weakening the
majority requirement spreads the range of equilibrium alternatives while preserving the
mean. When utilities are strictly concave, this implies that all individuals have a strict
preference for unanimity over any other majority rule. The conclusion is that in symmet-
ric populations unanimity is the unique Pareto efficient majority requirement. For general
asymmetric populations, where many majority rules are Pareto efficient, we examine rules
that maximize social surplus in the limit equilibrium. For large populations we show that
the first best policy is generically attainable as the limit equilibrium of some majority
rule. When utilities are tent-shaped (that is, when the cost of selecting an alternative
different from the peak is linear in its distance to the peak) the simple majority (and
generically no other rule) delivers the first best policy irrespective of the distribution of
peaks. For strictly concave utilities (the cost of selecting an alternative different from
the peak is is strictly convex in the distance) and distributions of peaks satisfying a mild
regularity condition, the optimal rule is a strict super-majority. This super-majority is
weaker than unanimity under natural specifications.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related
literature. The environment and the bargaining game are presented in section 3. In section
4 we characterize the stationary subgame perfect equilibrium and we establish its existence
and uniqueness. Section 5 examines Pareto Optimal rules under symmetric distributions
of peaks. Section 6 characterizes the unique asymptotic equilibrium outcome, and we
discuss the asymptotic efficiency of majority rules. Section 7 contains final remarks.
Proofs omitted from the main text are in the Appendix.
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2 Relation to the literature
The present paper contributes to the literature that addresses multilateral bargaining
over policy choices initiated by Baron and Ferejohn (1989). This literature has mostly
focussed to situations in which a unit of surplus must be distributed, and decisions require
a simple majority. Eraslan (2002) extends the analysis to set ups with heterogeneous
discounts and recognition probabilities, and considers the full range of (super) majority
rules. She establishes the uniqueness of equilibrium payoffs under linear utilities. Our
approach complements this literature by examining the opposite polar case: rather than
examining the transfers that are necessary for agreement, we examine negotiations where
agreements must lie in an interval, so that transfers of resources among the parties are
impossible.4 A general model that covers both approaches as particular cases is due
to Banks and Duggan (2000, 2006). They assume that alternatives are selected from
arbitrary compact convex subsets of an Euclidean space, and they examine bargaining
protocols where the proposer is selected at random and approval is determined by voting
rules in a general family. They prove existence of equilibria under very general conditions,
and they establish sufficient conditions for core equivalence. For set-ups where alternatives
are in an interval, they show that equilibria (in pure strategies) exist; and that for perfectly
patient players they are equivalent to core outcomes. Their results, however, do not
provide an explicit characterization of equilibria for impatient players, nor a discussion
of conditions for uniqueness. The issue of equilibrium uniqueness for one-dimensional
problems is addressed in Cho and Duggan (2003) and Cardona and Ponsati (2007). Under
the assumption of quadratic utilities Cho and Duggan (2003) characterize the equilibrium
and establish its uniqueness for games with random proposers and a set of decisions rules
that includes the simple majority, but not stronger super-majorities. For negotiations
that follow a deterministic protocol, the uniqueness of the equilibrium for all majority
rules is established in Cardona and Ponsati (2007). They also prove that, as players
4See also Eraslan and Merlo (2002), Jackson and Moselle (2002).
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become arbitrarily patient, the equilibrium converges to a single alternative, which is
independent of the protocol.5 These results apply to a very rich class of populations,
since peaks and utilities can vary across individuals. But this generality comes as the
expense of tractability. The characterization of equilibrium is rather involved and, unlike
in the present paper, the result are not easily ready for applications.
We remark that most of the literature concerns situations where an alternative is
selected only once and for all, none can be implemented in disagreement, and disagree-
ment is the worst outcome for everyone. Some important collective decisions are of this
nature; for example the location of a public facility or the appointment of public offi-
cials. Other policies, such as tax rates or minimum wages are chosen repeatedly over long
time horizons, and thus may be subject to recurrent re-negotiation. Bargaining when the
status-quo is not the worst outcome for all individuals is addressed in Banks and Duggan
(2006) for general set ups, and also considered in Cho and Duggan (2003). Baron (1996)
addresses situations where one dimensional policies are chosen repeatedly under simple
majority rule, and decisions become the status quo for future negotiations. Bucovetsky
(2003) discusses the effects of super-majority requirements in these environments.
Our results on the efficiency of (super)majority rules contribute to the literature on the
endogenous emergence, efficiency and stability of majority rules. The general analysis of
social choices over social choice rules is a classical problem. Its modern formalization starts
with the discussion of the distinctive role of unanimous consent by Buchanan and Tullock
(1963). Collective choices of majority rules under majoritarian regimes are discussed in
Greenberg (1979), Caplin and Nalebuff (1988), and Barbera` and Jackson (2004), among
others. The reader is referred to the later for a discussion of this literature. The efficiency
of super-majority rules in polities that choose within an interval is addressed in Aghion
and Bolton (2003) and Holden (2005). Their approach is to asses the expected social
benefits of different rules at a stage where individuals are ”under the veil of ignorance”,
5Predtetchinski (2007) establishes asymptotic uniqueness for games with random proposals.
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i.e. they still do not know what heir preferred policy will be. In contrast, we consider
individual preferences and collective choice of consensus rules after individual preferences
on alternatives are known. A very different model that discusses the choice of voting
rules among heterogeneous individuals is presented in Messner and Polborn (2004). They
examine voting rules to implement policy changes in an overlapping generations model
and argue that - because reforms benefit the young more than the old - the median voter
prefers a super-majority.
3 The model
A group of individuals I ⊂ [0, 1] must collectively select an alternative within the one
dimensional policy space [0, 1] . They negotiate over discrete time, t = 0, 1, 2.... with a
procedure that combines alternating proposals and voting. This environment is formally
described next.
Individual Payoffs. Individuals have single peaked utilities over policies and are impa-
tient. Upon a collective decision that selects alternative x ∈ [0, 1] at date t, individual i
obtains utility δtu (x, i), where
u (x, i) = v (|i− x|) ,
v is twice differentiable, decreasing and concave, with v(0) > v(1) ≥ 0, and δ ∈ (0, 1) is
the common discount rate. Note that the rigth and left derivatives u+x (x, i) and u
−
x (x, i) ,
are always well defined, and that they coincide for |i− x| > 0. Specifying a functional
form for the utility will be useful to examine examples that illustrate our results; the main
examples are tent-shaped utilities, i.e. u (x, i) = 1 − |x− i| , and quadratic utilities, i.e.
u (x, i) = 1− (x− i)2.
Distributions of Peaks. The different locations of the peaks are the only source of
heterogeneity within the population. Each i ∈ I denotes both a generic individual and
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the location of her peak, so that all the information regarding heterogeneity within the
population is embedded in the cumulative distribution function of peaks, denoted by F .
Given F , let (I,B, µ) denote the probability space where B is a σ−algebra of subsets of I,
and µ the probability measure induced by F . We will focus our analysis to the following
two distinct classes of populations. i) Small populations, where I = {i1, ..., in}, 0 = i1 <
i2 < ... < in = 1 , and n odd. ii) Large populations, where I = [0, 1] , and F has a
positive density f on (0, 1). The restrictive assumptions defining these two categories are
for expositional convenience, and can be relaxed. In particular, the results of section 4
and 5 directly apply to general populations characterized by any cumulative distribution
F .
Salient Policies. Within the policy space the following alternatives are specially rel-
evant. i) The median policy im is the alternative that coincides with the peak of the
median individual in I, i.e. im = in+1
2
, and F (im) = 1/2, respectively for a small and a
large population. ii) The mean policy ie is the alternative that coincides with the average
of individual peaks, i.e. ie =
∫ 1
0
idF (i). iii) The first best policy xfb is the alternative
that maximizes social surplus, S(x) =
∫ 1
0
u(x, i)dF (i), over the set [0, 1]. It is straight-
forward that the concavity of utilities implies the strict concavity of S. Since S ′(0) > 0
and S ′(1) < 0, for large populations the unique first best policy xfb, is given by the the
unique solution to the first order condition S ′(x) =
∫ 1
0
ux(x, i)dF (i) = 0.
Symmetry and Regularity. The symmetry properties of distributions play an important
role in our analysis. A distribution is symmetric if for every individual i ∈ [0, 1/2) ∩ I
there is an individual j = 1− i ∈ I, i.e. F (i) = 1− F (1− i) + µ(i) for all i ∈ I.
For non-symmetric populations, the following regularity properties will also be useful.
Given a positive density f on (0, 1) we define its induced symmetric density f̂ as follows:
a) If f is such that im ≤ 1/2 then f̂(x) = f(x) for x ∈ [0, im] , f̂(x) = f(2im − x) for
x ∈ [im, 2im] , and f̂(x) = 0 for x ∈ [2im, 1] . b) If f is such that im ≥ 1/2 then f̂(x) = f(x)
for x ∈ [im, 1] , f̂(x) = f(2im− x) for x ∈ [1− 2im, im] , and f̂(x) = 0 for x ∈ [0, 1− 2im] .
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We say that F is symmetry regular if f is positive over [0, 1] and f̂ is constructed by
transferring mass towards the median: That is, f̂ crosses f only once, from above if
im ≤ 1/2, and from below if im ≥ 1/2. (See Figure 1, where at f̂ agents with higher
peaks are substituted with the agents with lower peaks, from A to B.) We say that a
distribution F is mean-median regular if either a) im < ie < 1/2 and F (ie) + ie < 1, or b)
im > ie > 1/2 and F (ie)+ ie > 1. Both conditions are mild, and hold under most common
specifications. 6
Figure 1: A regular density f and its induced symmetric density f̂ .
Majority Rules and Boundary Players. Q ⊂ [1/2, 1] denotes the set of admissible
majority rules, which is Q = {k/n : k ∈ {(n+ 1) /2, ..., n}} for small populations, and
Q = [1/2, 1] when the population is large. For each q ∈ Q, W (q) denotes the set of
winning coalitions under q, that is
W (q) = {S ∈ B : µ (S) ≥ q} .
6In particular it is easy to check the conditions hold in Triangular, Beta, and Standard Two-Sided
Power distributions.
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A collective decision under majority q ∈ Q requires the support of a subset S ∈ W (q) .
Given F and q the boundary players play a crucial role in the bargaining game. They
are the two individuals, l and r, that can constitute (tight) q majority with all the indi-
viduals on their right and on their left, respectively; i.e. F (l) = 1− q and F (r) = q.
The Bargaining Game. For each environment, i.e. a tuple (F, u, δ, q), which is common
knowledge, the negotiation begins at t = 0 and proceed as follows. At each t ≥ 0 an
individual is selected at random (all with equal probability) to make a proposal. Then,
she chooses an alternative in [0, 1] and all other players, sequentially in the natural order,
reply with acceptance or rejection. The proposal is approved if the subset of players that
accept it (including the proposer) is a winning coalition S ∈ W (q). Upon approval, the
agreed alternative is implemented and the game ends. Otherwise, the game moves to
t+ 1, a new proposer is selected, and so on.
An individual strategy specifies actions - a proposal, and an acceptance/rejection rule
- for each subgame. At a stationary strategy each individual makes the same proposal
whenever she is selected and always accepts proposals that are no further away from her
peak than some given threshold. A stationary subgame perfect equilibrium (henceforth an
equilibrium) is a profile of stationary strategies that are mutually best responses at each
subgame, and such that no individual uses weakly dominated actions.7
In the sequel the existence of a unique equilibrium for each environment (F, u, δ, q),
is established, and its explicit characterization is provided. Hence, the individual and
collective expected benefits can be evaluated and compared over the different values of q.
This comparative statics exercise allows to examine efficiency of different majority rules.
7The later requirement rules out equilibria sustained by weakly dominated acceptances at the voting
stage. This is a superfluous restriction when the population is small (since acceptance/rejection moves
are assumed sequential), but not when it is large.
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4 Equilibrium
In this section we characterize the equilibrium for each environment (F, u, δ, q) and we
establish existence and uniqueness. Our first result, Proposition 1, states that an equi-
librium is fully described by the the approval set - the subset of alternatives that get the
acceptance of a q majority - and establishes existence and uniqueness. Our second result,
Proposition 2, supplies necessary and sufficient conditions to determine the approval set.
This later result is crucial in two respects: it is instrumental to prove the the existence
and uniqueness of the equilibrium, and at the same time it provides the tool for an explicit
computation of the equilibrium that allows to carry out comparative statics.
Proposition 1 Equilibrium Characterization, Existence and Uniqueness. Fix
an environment (F, u, δ, q).
1. An equilibrium is fully characterized by the approval set, that is, the set of all al-
ternatives that are accepted at least by a majority q. The approval set is an interval
[x, x], 0 ≤ x < x ≤ 1, and the payoffs and actions of a generic individual i are as
follows:
(a) Expected payoffs are
Ui[x, x] = F (x)u (x, i) +
x∫
x
u (z, i) dF (z) + (1− F (x))u (x, i) .
(b) A proposal x is accepted by i if and only if u(x, i) ≥ δUi[x, x]
(c) When i is appointed to propose, she proposes her peak xi = i if i ∈ [x, x] ;
otherwise she proposes xi = x if i < x, or xi = x if i > x.
2. An equilibrium exists and it is unique.
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Overview of the proof. Because stationary subgame perfect equilibria involve no de-
lay, every proposal arising in equilibrium must receive the favorable vote of (at least) a
majority q. An individual votes for a proposal only if it lies in her acceptable set, i.e.
in the subset of alternatives that are better than delaying play for one period. And a
proposal is approved only if it lies in the approval set, the subset of alternatives that are
in the acceptable sets of some majority of size at least q. Therefore, the proposer puts
forward her most preferred alternative within the approval set. Characterizing an equi-
librium is tantamount to providing the necessary and sufficient conditions to determine
the approval set. These conditions require a fixed point: From an interval of alternatives
that receive approval, we compute the associated expected payoffs, which determine the
individual acceptance sets, and in turn induce an interval of approval. In equilibrium, the
later approval set must coincide with the former. This condition is described precisely in
Proposition 2, where we also observe that it delivers one, and only one solution. Hence,
the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium follows.
Proof. Fix an equilibrium and let us address its properties in detail.
Random Equilibrium Outcome. It is well known that, in the present framework, all
stationary subgame perfect equilibria must be in pure strategies and involve no delay. (See
Banks and Duggan (2000) for a formal discussion of this result). Hence, each individual
makes the same proposal whenever she is selected. Denote by xi the (time independent)
proposal of a typical player i. Given the uniform random selection of proposers, the
alternative that prevails as the equilibrium outcome arises as a random draw xi ∼ [x, x],
with some given distribution induced by F . Let Ui denote the time invariant expected
utility of player i (prior to appointing the proposer) and let xe denote the expected
equilibrium alternative.
Individual Acceptance Sets. Note that (as v′′ ≤ 0) Ui ≤ u (xe, i) ≤ u (i, i). Player i
accepts a proposal x if and only if x ∈ Ai = {z ∈ [0, 1] : u (z, i) ≥ δUi}. Since preferences
are single-peaked, this set is non-empty and connected; i.e., player i’s acceptance set takes
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Figure 2: Individual acceptance set
the form Ai = [xi, xi] and x
e ∈ Ai for all i ∈ I. Figure 2 displays the construction of
individual acceptance sets.
Coalition Acceptance Sets. Given the individual acceptance sets, the set of alterna-
tives that is accepted by a coalition S ∈ B is
AS = {z ∈ [0, 1] : u (z, i) ≥ δUi for all i ∈ S} = ∩i∈SAi.
Since is xe ∈ Ai for all i ∈ I this intersection non-empty and connected. That is, it takes
the form of AS = [xS, xS] where
xS = max {xi : i ∈ S} and xS = min {xi : i ∈ S} .
Approval Set. Consider the approval set, i.e. the set of all the alternatives that receive
approval. An alternative in the approval set must lie in the coalition acceptance set for
some winning coalition under majority q. Hence the approval set is
A = {z ∈ [0, 1] : z ∈ AS for some S ∈ W (q)} .
Define
x = min {xS : S ∈ W (q)} , and x = max {xS : S ∈ W (q)} .
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Now observe that the approval set defined above must be an interval A = [x, x]. Clearly
x and x lie in the approval set by definition. Furthermore, for any x ∈ [x, x] there exists
S ∈ W (q) such that x ∈ AS. To prove this claim let S1, S2 ∈ W (q) be such that
x = xS1 and x = xS2 .
We know that xe ∈ AS1 ∩ AS2 , implying that xS2 ≤ xS1 . Thus, as AS1 and AS2 are
connected sets, we have that for any x ∈ [x, x] either x ∈ AS1 or x ∈ AS2 .
Equilibrium Proposals and expected payoffs. Proposals are approved if and only if
they lie in the approval set, and this set is an interval [x, x]. Hence, players propose the
alternative that they like best within the approval set. That is, xi = x for players i < x,
xi = x for players i > x, and players i ∈ [x, x] must propose their peak. Congruently, the
expected payoff (prior to appointment of the proposer) of a typical player i is Ui[x, x].
We have thus proved 1.
To prove 2 we examine further the conditions that determine the approval set [x, x] .
Determining the Approval Set. Consider an interval of alternatives [x, x], and assume
that it is the approval set. We can compute the associated expected payoffs Ui[x, x], and
determine the corresponding individual acceptance sets Ai. From the collection individual
acceptance sets, we can in turn construct the induced approval set. In equilibrium the later
must coincide with [x, x]. The necessary and sufficient condition assuring that an interval
[x, x] is the approval set of an equilibrium is stated in Proposition 2. This proposition
shows that the approval set is the intersection of the acceptance sets of the two boundary
players l and r, it describes how to compute the values of x and x, and it establishes
that this computation admits one and only one solution. The existence and uniqueness
of the approval set implies in turn the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium. And
the proof of Proposition 1 is complete.
The precise characterization of the approval set, that we present in Proposition 2,
requires some additional notation. For an arbitrary interval [a, b] ⊂ [0, 1], let Ui[a, b] =
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F (a)u(a, i)+
∫ b
a
u(x, i)dF (x)+(1−F (b))u(b, i). For each pair (x, i) ∈ [0, 1]2, if the equation
u (z, i) = δUi[x, z] admits a solution z ∈ (x, 1], then we denote it by s (x, i). Similarly if
u (z, i) = δUi[z, x] admits a solution z ∈ [0, x), then we denote it by s (x, i). Lemma 10 (in
the Appendix) establishes the existence of threshold values a (i) , a (i) , b (i) , b (i) ∈ [0, 1]
such that s(x, i) exists if and only if x ∈ [a (i) , a (i)] and s(x, i) exists if and only if
x ∈ [b (i) , b (i)]. Furthermore, when s(x, i) or s(x, i) exist, they are unique. We may now
define ζ : [0, 1]2 → [0, 1], and ζ : [0, 1]2 → [0, 1], as follows:
ζ (x, i) ≡
 s (x, i) , if x ∈ [a (i) , a (i)]1, otherwise;
and
ζ (x, i) ≡
 s (x, i) , if x ∈
[
b (i) , b (i)
]
,
0, otherwise.
.
We are now ready to state the explicit characterization of the approval set. It is obtained
as a fixed point of the function ζ (., l) , ζ(., r) : [0, 1]2 → [0, 1]2.
Proposition 2 Characterization of the Approval Set. Fix an environment
(F, u, δ, q) and consider an equilibrium. Then the approval set is the intersection of the
acceptance sets of the boundary players l and r, that is [x, x] = [xr, xl]. Furthermore, the
values of x and x are given by
x = ζ(x, r) and x = ζ(x, l), (1)
and these conditions yield one and only one solution.
Proof. Note that the first equation in (1) translates as
u (x, r) = δUr or x = 0 if u (0, r) ≥ δUr.
We show by contradiction that this condition is necessary. Suppose that u (x, r) > δUr
and u (0, r) < δUr. By continuity, there exists y < x such that u (y, r) = δUr, and
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therefore u (y, i) > δUi for all i < r (see Lemma 11 in the Appendix for a formal proof).
Thus, y is accepted by all players i ≤ r. Hence, a q−majority accepts y < x, contradicting
that x is the lower bound of the approval set. Similarly, if u (x, r) < δUr then (again by
Lemma 11) more than a fraction q of players reject x, contradicting that x lies in the
approval set. A similar argument applies to show that x = ζ(x, l) is necessary.
It is immediate that the condition is also sufficient, since all proposals in [x, x] are
accepted by a q−majority of players, and all that lie outside are rejected by a by a
q−majority of players.
Lemma 12 in the Appendix establishes the existence and uniqueness of a solution pair
to condition (1).
Proposition 2 supplies the tools for an explicit computation. Figure 3 displays the
determination of the approval set for an example.
Figure 3: Solving equation (1) for u(i, x) = 1 − (x − i)2, δ = .95, q = 0.65. and F such
that l = 0.419 and r = .581. The approval set is [0.303, 0.697].
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Thanks to the explicit computation of the approval set we can examine the variation
of outcomes across different majority requirements. As an illustration Figures 4 and 5
display the approval sets as a function of q for some examples with u (x, i) = 1− (i− x)2,
and δ = .99.
Figure 4: Two symmetric distributions of peaks, and the corresponding approval sets as
a function of q.
Figure 5: Two asymmetric distributions of peaks, and the corresponding approval sets as
a function of q.
17
5 Pareto Optimal rules, and the efficiency of una-
nimity in symmetric populations.
The uniqueness of the equilibrium for each majority rule opens the door to comparative
statics exercises that measure the effects of changing q over a given environment (F, u, δ).
To emphasize that the unique equilibrium clearly depends on what majority rule applies,
we will write the approval set under majority rule q as [x(q), x(q)].We can now consider the
preferences of individual i over q ∈ Q, which are naturally given by Ui(q) ≡ Ui[x(q), x(q)].
With these individual preferences well specified for all i ∈ I, we can asses the efficiency
of the rules in Q.
The minimal requirement of efficiency is Pareto Optimality. We will say that q ∈ Q
is a Pareto optimal majority rule for (u, F, δ) if there is no q′ ∈ Q, q′ 6= q such that
Ui[x(q
′), x(q′)] ≥ Ui[x(q), x(q)] for all i ∈ I, with strict inequality for a subset S ⊂ I, such
that µ(S) > 0.
Recall the equilibrium outcomes displayed in Figure 4, and note that the approval sets
shrink symmetrically around 1/2 as the consensus requirement increases. For concave
utilities this implies that individual benefits increase in q, and hence stronger majorities
dominate weaker majorities. We will argue next that the features displayed in the example
are general in symmetric populations. In fact, for every symmetric population the approval
set shrinks symmetrically around 1/2 as q increases and therefore individual payoffs Ui(q)
are strictly increasing in q for all i ∈ I. Consequently, if F is symmetric, q = 1 is uniquely
Pareto optimal for all (u, δ).
Proposition 3 establishes in full generality that weakening q induces a mean preserving
spread of the approval set.
Proposition 3 (Weakening q induces a mean preserving spread of the outcome distribu-
tion). Fix two environments (F, u, δ, q) and (F, u, δ, q′) where F is symmetric and q < q′,
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then x (q) < x (q′) < x (q′) < x (q) , and the distribution of equilibrium outcomes under q
is a mean preserving spread of the distribution under q′.
Proof. ζ (x, l) is increasing in l (see Lemma 15 in the Appendix). The symmetry of
F implies that the boundary players are symmetric, r = 1 − l, and consequently the
approval set is symmetric, x = 1−x. On the other hand, as the fraction of votes required
for approval increases from q to q′, l (strictly) decreases and r (strictly) increases.
For each q, x and x solve (1), i.e. x = ζ(x, r) and x = ζ(x, l), for l = F−1 (1− q) and
r = F−1 (q). Now, since 1 − x = x, it is also necessary that 1 − x = ζ (x, l) . Hence, an
increase in q, decreases l = F−1 (1− q) and must therefore also decrease ζ (x, l) for any
x. Hence, if q′ > q, then x(q′) ≤ x(q) and x(q′) = 1 − x(q′) ≥ 1 − x(q) = x(q). Since,
[x (q) , x (q)] 6= [x (q′) , x (q′)] we conclude that x(q′) < x(q) and x(q′) > x(q).
By the symmetry of F, we conclude that the distribution of equilibrium outcomes
under q is a mean preserving spread of the distribution of equilibrium outcomes under q′.
It is well known that, for any strictly concave utility, a mean preserving spread induces
a decrease in expected utility. Hence when v′′ < 0 all i ∈ I prefer q′ over q. When v′′ = 0,
the utilities remain strictly concave for players that have their peak in [x (1) , x (1)] , for
other players the utility is linear and thus a mean preserving spread leaves them indifferent.
Hence the following holds.
Proposition 4 For every (F, u, δ) where F is symmetric the unanimity rule, q = 1, is
the unique Pareto optimal rule.
A remark on bargaining to distribute surplus. It is perhaps useful to point out
that a result similar to Proposition 4 holds in negotiations to split surplus a` la Baron and
Ferejohn (1989). When players must share one unit of surplus unanimity is also uniquely
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Pareto optimal, provided that individuals are identical and utilities are strictly concave.8
See Proposition 9 in the Appendix.
Pareto Optimality in Asymmetric populations. When the distribution of peaks
is not symmetric Pareto Optimality no longer selects a unique majority rule, and many
(if not all) q ∈ Q are Pareto optimal. This is easy to see in Figure 5, that displays the
approval sets under the different majority rules for a large asymmetric population. Note
that as q increases the approval set shrinks, and the average outcome drifts. So that a
decrease of q leads to a spread which is not mean preserving. Hence some types are better
off at weak majorities while others prefer large supermajorities. For these environments
a natural optimality criterion to discriminate within Pareto Optimal rules is to evaluate
the social surplus that they deliver. This is what we do next.
6 Rules that maximize (asymptotical) social surplus
Our goal in this section is to explore what rules maximize surplus for asymmetric pop-
ulations. Since it seems sensible to examine the performance of majority rules in a way
that does not depend on δ, we first address the characterization of equilibrium outcomes
in the limit as δ → 1.
6.1 Asymptotic equilibrium outcomes
In games with perfectly patient players, i.e. δ = 1, every outcome in the core - that is in the
set [l, r] - can be sustained as an equilibrium. And this set is large for supermajorities q >
1/2. However, if we consider a sequence of games with δ < 1, as players become perfectly
patient δ → 1, the approval set converges to a single alternative, and the asymptotic
equilibrium outcome is unique. This result is established in Proposition 5 that we state
8Concavity is not sufficient, with linear utilities all majority rules deliver exactly the same payoffs.
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next. Proposition 5 also supplies a straightforward closed form characterization of the
limit outcome for each (u, F, q).
Proposition 5 Unique asymptotic outcome. Consider a sequence of environments
(F, u, q, δk), where δk → 1. As δk → 1 the approval set converges to a unique asymptotic
equilibrium outcome
lim
δk→1
x = lim
δk→1
x = x∗.
1. The asymptotic equilibrium outcome x∗ is the unique solution to
K(x) ≡ F (x) u
+
x (x, l)
u (x, l)
+ [1− F (x)] u
−
x (x, r)
u (x, r)
= 0, (2)
whenever this equation admits a solution x∗ ∈ [l, r].
2. Otherwise, there exists a unique individual i∗ ∈ I ∩ [l, r] such that K(x) > 0 for
x ∈ [l, i∗) and K(x) < 0 for x ∈ [i∗, r], and x∗ = i∗.
Proof. The result follows by Lemmata 13 and 14 which are proved in the Appendix. By
Lemma 13 the approval set converges to a singleton. Lemma 14 assures that the proposed
limit alternative lies in the approval set for all δ < 1.
For a symmetric population the previous result implies that limδ→1 x = limδ→1 x =
x∗ = 1/2 for all q. When the population is not symmetric the asymptotic outcome
coincides with the median im at q = 1/2 and varies over a wide range as q increases.
To examine this variation, we write x(q) to denote the different values of x∗ as a
function of q, for (u, F ) given. For a large populations, where equation (2) applies,
computing x(q) is straight forward. As an illustration we have carried out the exercise
for tent shaped and quadratic utilities, under two illustrative specifications of F . The
results are displayed in Figures 6 and 7. In the example displayed in Figure 6, x(q) is
monotonically increasing. The example of Figure 7 shows that x(q) can be non monotonic.
Next we turn to the analysis of surplus maximizing rules in the limit as δ → 1.
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Figure 6: An example where x(q) increases in q. Utilities are tent-shaped.
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Figure 7: An example where x(q) is non monotonic in q. Utilities are quadratic.
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6.2 (Asymptotically) Efficient rules
Given (u, F ), the approval set converges to the single alternative x(q), and the asymptotic
payoff for individual i is u(x(q), i). Hence, the asymptotic social surplus delivered by q is
WAS(q) =
∫ 1
0
u(x(q), i)dF (i).
The set of (asymptotically) feasible alternatives, i.e. those that arise as x(q) for some q
∈ Q, is a strict subset of [0, 1]. When the maximization of social surplus within this set
is the efficiency criterion, the best conceivable performance would be delivered by a first
best rule - i.e. a rule q ∈ Q such that x(q) = xfb.
Does a first best rule always exists? Under a symmetric distribution the first best is
1/2 and x(q) = 1/2 for all q ∈ Q, and therefore all majorities are (trivially) first best
rules. For asymmetric populations, a first best rule generically does not exist for small
populations: Since Q is finite xfb will generically not be feasible. We next turn to examine
the existence and properties the first best rule for large asymmetric populations.
A transparent analysis requires the specification of utilities. Let us begin with the
case of tent-shaped utilities, u (x, i) = 1− |x− i|, where it is immediate to see that a first
best rule exists for all F .
Proposition 6 A simple majority is the first best rule for tent-shaped
utilities. Consider a large population with F asymmetric and u(x, i) = 1 − |x− i| .
a) If im 6= 1/2, then x(q) = ifb = im if and only if q = 1/2. b) If im = 1/2, then
x(1/2) = x(1) = ifb = im.
Proof. The first order condition that characterizes xfb is equivalent to F (x) = 1−F (x),
and therefore xfb = im. Since x(1/2) = im for all F , q = 1/2 is a first best rule. If
im = 1/2, then x(1) = 1/2, and consequently the unanimity rule also delivers the first
best. For generic distributions such that im 6= 1/2, no other rule delivers im.
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The optimality of the simple majority does not extend beyond the tent-shaped specifi-
cation. If individuals suffer a strictly convex cost when the selected alternative is distant
form the peak, then the rule that maximizes social surplus (i.e. the first best rule when
it exists) is a strict super-majority.
Proposition 7 Optimal super-majorities. Assume the distribution of peaks F is
symmetric regular and v′′ < 0. Then, the rule that maximizes social surplus is a strict
super-majority.
Proof. We prove the result for scenarios where im < 1/2. The symmetric argument
applies when im > 1/2.
From density f construct its induced symmetric density function f̂ . Observe that im is
the first best allocation under f̂ . Since utilities are strictly concave and f has more mass
of agents with high peaks it must be that
S ′ (im) =
∫ 1
0
ux (i
m, i) f(i)di >
∫ 1
0
ux (i
m, i) f̂(i)di = 0,
that is, social surplus is increasing at im. On the other hand, x(1) solves
F (x)
ux (x, 0)
u (x, 0)
+ [1− F (x)] ux (x, 1)
u (x, 1)
= 0.
The concavity of utilities implies that the left hand side of the preceding equality is strictly
decreasing in x. Since im < 1/2, it follows that
F (im)
ux (i
m, 0)
u (im, 0)
+ [1− F (im)] ux (i
m, 1)
u (im, 1)
=
1
2
(
ux (i
m, 0)
u (im, 0)
+
ux (i
m, 1)
u (im, 1)
)
> 0,
implying that im < x(1). Hence, as x(q) is continuous, social surplus is maximal at some
q ∈ (1/2, 1] .
To conclude we examine the case of quadratic utilities u(x, i) = 1− (x− i)2. For this
specification mean-median regularity assures that a first best rule exist, and that it is a
supermajority weaker than unanimity.
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Proposition 8 The first best rule for quadratic utilities. Consider a large
population where F is mean-median regular and u(x, i) = 1−(x−i)2. Then x(q) = ifb = ie
for some 1/2 < q < 1.
Proof. We first give a sufficient condition that assures existence of the first best rule for all
utilities. The concavity of u implies that F (x)ux (x, l) + [1− F (x)]ux (x, r) is decreasing
in x. Denote by x˜ the (unique) solution to F (x)ux (x, 0) + [1− F (x)]ux (x, 1) = 0. If
im ≤ 1/2 and xfb ∈ [im, x˜], or im ≥ 1/2 and xfb ∈ [x˜, im], then there is a q ∈ [1/2, 1] such
that x(q) = xfb. Consider w.l.o.g. the case im ≤ 1/2. Since x(1) solves F (x) ux(x,0)
u(x,0)
+
[1− F (x)] ux(x,1)
u(x,1)
= 0, it must be that x (1) < 1/2 and therefore u(x (1) , 0) > u(x (1) , 1).
Thus, x(1) > x˜ ≥ xfb ≥ x(1/2) = im and, by continuity there is q such that x(q) = xfb.
For u(x, i) = 1− (x− i)2, the first order condition for social surplus maximization is∫ 1
0
(x− i)dF (i) = 0, which implies that xfb = ∫ 1
0
idF (i) = ie. By mean-median regularity
either im < ie < 1/2 and F (ie) + ie < 1, or the reverse inequalities hold. Assume, w.l.o.g.
the first. Then, F (ie)ux (i
e, 0) + [1− F (ie)]ux (ie, 1) = 1− ie − F (ie) > 0 so that ie < x˜,
and the sufficient condition for existence holds.
7 Final remarks
We have assumed a general distributions of peaks and a random protocol that selects
all players with equal probability. Thus, the distribution of peaks determines both the
distribution of proposals and the decisive players l and r. Our results generalize easily
to a set up where the selection of the proposer does not follow the uniform distribution.
One would simply need to redefine the expected payoffs given an approval set, U [x, y] ,
to account for the new proposal distribution. Clearly, proposal rights are important to
determine the equilibrium.9 However, under non-degenerate random protocols the bound-
9The importance of proposal rights over voting rights and impatience is stressed by Kalandrakis (2006).
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ary players l and r remain determinant, even as players become perfectly patient: The
asymptotic outcome must always lie within [l, r]. An obvious but important implication
is that, since under a simple majority l = r = im, the median peak prevails regardless of
the distribution of proposal rights.
An important feature of our model is that an immediate agreement prevails in equi-
librium regardless of the majority required. In real negotiations, disagreements are a real
possibility, and proposals failure to get approval seems more likely the greater the ma-
jority needed. This suggests that in bargaining processes with inefficient outcomes, the
forces favoring supermajorities are more limited. We plan to explore this issue in future
research.
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Appendix
On bargaining to distribute surplus. Consider the game to split one unit of surplus
among a finite population where bargaining follows the usual protocol: A proposer is
selected with probability 1/n, and approval requires the acceptance of k responders, k =
(n − 1)/2, ..., n − 1. In equilibrium the proposer must offer a distribution of the surplus
among the individuals x = (x1, ...xn), such that
∑
i∈I
xi = 1, xi ≥ 0. Assume that benefits
upon approval of (x, t) are δtu(xi),where u(0) = 0, u
′ > 0, u′′ < 0.
Proposition 9 Consider a finite population that bargains to split one unit of surplus.
Then the following holds:
1. In equilibrium the proposer offers a distribution where the share of k opponents is
xr such that
u(xr) = δ
(
1
n
u(1− kxr) + k
n
u(xr)
)
,
the share to the remaining respondents is xj = 0 , and her own share is xi = 1−kxr.
Individuals that are offered xr accept, and the proposal is approved.
2. Prior to the selection of the proposer individual expected utility is strictly increasing
in k, so that unanimity q = 1 is the unique Pareto optimal rule.
Proof. The characterization of equilibrium is standard. The share xr must leave the
responders indifferent to their expected continuation payoff. That is xr = x, where
u (x) = δ
[
1
n
u (1− kx) + k
n
u (x)
]
, that is
u (1− kx)
u (x)
=
n− δk
δ
.
Note that u′′ < 0 implies that xr increases in k. Let A (k, x) ≡ u(1−kx)u(x) and B(k) ≡ n−δkδ .
For any k there is a unique solution, since ∂A
∂x
= −ku
′(1−kx)u(x)−u′(x)u(1−kx)
u(x)2
< 0 and ∂B
∂x
= 0.
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Moreover, ∂B
∂k
= −1 and ∂A
∂k
= −xu
′(1−kx)
u(x)
= −u′(1−kx)
u (x)
x
> −u′(1−kx)
u′(x) > −1, implying that
∂xr
∂k
> 0.
Now the ex-ante expected utility under rule that requires k votes is
Eu(k) =
1
n
u(1− kxr(k)) + k
n
u(xr(k)).
Substituting u(1− (k − 1)xr) = u(xr)n−δ(k−1)δ , yields
Eu(k) =
1
n
u(xr(k))
n− δ(k − 1)
δ
+
k
n
u(xr(k))
= u(xr(k))
(
n− δ(k − 1)
δn
+
k
n
)
= u(xr(k))
n+ δ
nδ
,
which is increasing in k provided that xr(k) increases in k.
Lemma 10 Consider s(x, i) and s(x, i) defined as
s(x, i) = z ∈ (x, 1] such that u (z, i) = δUi[x, z],
and
s(x, i) = z ∈ [0, x) such that u (z, i) = δUi[z, x].
1. If s(x, i) exists, then it is unique, and similarly for s(x, i).
2. There exists some threshold values a, a, b, b ∈ [0, 1] such that s(x, i) exists if and only
if x ∈ [a, a] and s(x, i) exists if and only if x ∈ [b, b].
Proof. 1. Fix x ∈ [0, 1] and define κ(z;x) = u (z, i) − δUi[x, z], so that κ′(z;x) =
ux (z, i) (1− δ (1− F (z))), which is positive when z < i, and negative at z > i. Hence by
single-peakedness κ(z;x) = 0 has at most two solutions: one with z ≤ i and another with
z > i. Notice, however, that κ(x;x) = u (x, i) (1− δ) > 0 so that at most one solution
z > x exists.
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2. Next, we show that when s (x, i) and s (y, i) do exist, with x ≤ y, then s (w, i)
exists for any w ∈ [x, y].
Assume otherwise, i.e., κ(z;w) = u (z, i) − δUi[w, z] > 0 for all z ≥ i. Then, in
particular
κ(1;w) = u (1, i)− δUi[w, 1] > 0, (3)
κ(1;x) = u (1, i)− δUi[x, 1] ≤ 0, (4)
κ(1; y) = u (1, i)− δUi[y, 1] ≤ 0. (5)
We distinguish two cases: either (a) u (w, i) ≥ u (y, i) or (b) u (x, i) < u (w, i) < u (y, i)
In case (a)
Ui[w, 1] = F (w)u (w, i) +
1∫
w
u (z, i) dF (z) > F (w)u (y, i) +
y∫
w
u (y, i) dF (z) +
1∫
y
u (z, i) dF (z) =
= F (w)u (y, i) + [F (y)− F (w)]u (y, i) +
1∫
y
u (z, i) dF (z) = F (y)u (y, i) +
1∫
y
u (z, i) dF (z)
Now, using (5) it is immediate that κ(1;w) ≤ 0, contradicting (3).
In case (b) from (4) we have that
Ui[x, 1] = F (x)u (x, i)+
1∫
x
u (z, i) dF (z) = F (x)u (x, i)+
w∫
x
u (z, i) dF (z)+
1∫
w
u (z, i) dF (z) ≥ u (1, i)
δ
.
Moreover, from (3),
Ui[x, 1] = F (w)u (w, i) +
1∫
w
u (z, i) dF (z) <
u (1, i)
δ
.
Thus, using (4)
F (x)u (x, i) +
w∫
x
u (z, i) dF (z) +
1∫
w
u (z, i) dF (z) > F (w)u (w, i) +
1∫
w
u (z, i) dF (z) .
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I.e.,
F (x)u (x, i) + [F (w)− F (x)]u (w, i) > F (x)u (x, i) +
w∫
x
u (z, i) dF (z) > F (w)u (w, i)
so that
F (x) [u (x, i)− u (w, i)] > 0
which is a contradiction.
Lemma 11 Fix an equilibrium and let [x, x] be the approval set. Then, the following
hold:
1. If u (x, i) ≤ δUi then u (x, j) < δUj for any j such that j > i.
2. If u (x, i) ≥ δUi then u (x, j) > δUj for any j such that j < i.
3. If u (x, i) ≤ δUi then u (x, j) < δUj for any j such that j < i.
4. If u (x, i) ≥ δUi then u (x, j) > δUj for any j such that j > i.
Proof. We prove statement 1. A similar argument applies to prove 2, 3 and 4.
Assume otherwise, i.e., u (x, j) ≥ δUj for some j > i such that u (x, i) ≤ δUi. Hence,
u (x, i) ≤ δ(F (x)u (x, i) +
x∫
x
u (z, i) dF (z) + (1− F (x))u (x, i)), (6)
and
u (x, j) ≥ δ(F (x)u (x, j) +
x∫
x
u (z, j) dF (z) + (1− F (x))u (x, j)). (7)
Let dij = j − i denote the distance between the peaks of the players i and j. Be-
cause utilities are identical among players except by the location of their peak u (x, j) =
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u (x− dij, i) . 10 Moreover, by concavity it must be that u (x, i)−u (x− dij, i) is decreasing
in x. Adding up equations (6) and (7) we have that
u (x, i)− u (x, j) ≤
≤ δ(F (x) (u (x, i)− u (x, j)) +
x∫
x
(u (z, i)− u (z, j)) dF (z) + (1− F (x)) (u (x, i)− u (x, j))) =
= δ(F (x) (u (x, i)− u (x− dij, i)) +
x∫
x
(u (z, i)− u (z − dij, i)) dF (z) +
+ (1− F (x)) (u (x, i)− u (x− dij, i)))
≤ δ (u (x, i)− u (x− dij, i)) = δ [u (x, i)− u (x, j)] ,
(where the last inequality follows by concavity) which is a contradiction.
Lemma 12 For each environment (F, u, δ, q), condition (1) admits one and only one
solution.
Proof. Note that ζ and ζ are continuous and differentiable (with respect to x) al-
most everywhere. More precisely, ζ is differentiable in (0, 1) − {a (i) , a (i)} and ζ is
differentiable in (0, 1) − {b (i) , b (i)}. Direct computations establish that, ζx (x, l) =
δF (x)
1− δ + δF (x)
ux (x, l)
ux (x, l)
, for x ∈ (a (l) , a (l)).11 And clearly ζx (x, l) = 0, elsewhere. Now,
for x ∈ (a (l) , a (l)), notice that F (r) = q and F (l) = 1 − q implies that l ≤ r and
therefore u (x, l) ≤ u (x, l), since otherwise, by Lemma 11 we contradict Proposition
2. By symmetry and concavity of the utilities the preceding inequality implies that
|ux (x, l)| ≥ |ux (x, r)|. Hence, in any case
∣∣ζx (x, l)∣∣ < 1. A similar argument proves that∣∣∣ζ
x
(x, l)
∣∣∣ < 1. Thus, (1) admits at most one solution.
10Note that u (x− dij , i) is well defined even if x− dij < 0.
11Note that the existence of s (x, l) implies ux (x, l) < 0, and the existence of s (x, r) implies ux (x, r) >
0.
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To see that a solution indeed exists, note that ζ(., l) and ζ(., r) are continuous, with
ζ (0, l) ≤ 1, ζ (1, l) = 1, ζ (0, r) = 0 and ζ (1, r) ≥ 0.
Lemma 13 As δ → 1 the approval set converges to a singleton.
Proof. Step 1: If there exists ε > 0 such that for all δ ∈ (0, 1) there exists δ > δ such
that x (q)− x (q) > ε, then both x (q) < 1 and x (q) > 0.
Assume x (q) = 0, and therefore x (q) > ε,which implies that for all δ ∈ (0, 1) there
exists δ > δ such that u (x, r) ≥ u (x, r) + η, where η = u (ε, r)−u (0, r) > 0. In this case,
u (x, r) = δF (x)u (x, r) + δ
∫ x
x
u (z, r) dF (z) + δ (1− F (x))u (x, r) >
> δ [F (x)u (x, r) + (F (x)− F (x))u (x, r) + (1− F (x))u (x, r)]
= δF (x)u (x, r) + δ (1− F (x))u (x, r)
≥ δF (x)u (x, r) + δ (1− F (x))u (x, r) + δ (1− F (x)) η
= δu (x, r) + δ (1− F (x)) η
Thus,
u (x, r) [1− δ] > δη [1− F (x)] (8)
Thus, there is δ ∈ (0, 1) such that if for all δ > δ we have that x (q) − x (q) > ε we
contradict inequality (8).12
Step 2: If u (x, l) = δUl, u (x, r) = δUr and l < r then the approval set converges to
a singleton as δ → 1.
Note that u (x, l) = δUl implies that u (x, r) > δUr, since otherwise (by Lemma 16)
u (x, l) < δUl. Also, u (x, r) = δUr implies u (x, l) > δUl. Hence, u (x, l) > u (x, l) and
12It is immediate to see that x = 1 and x = 0 cannot be simultaneously satisfied when δ is big enough. If
u (0, r) < u (1, r) just chose δ ≥ u (0, r) /u (xcr, r) < 1 to get a contradiction. Otherwise, u (0, r) ≥ u (1, r)
implies that u (0, l) ≥ u (1, l) and we get also a contradiction by choosing δ ≥ u (1, l) /u (xcl , l) < 1. Hence,
1− F (x) > 0.
35
u (x, r) < u (x, r). Therefore, single-peakedness implies u (x, l) < u (z, l) and u (x, r) <
u (z, r) for any z ∈ (x, x). We know that
u (x, l) = δF (x)u (x, l) + δ
∫ x
x
u (z, l) dF (z) + δ (1− F (x))u (x, l) ≥
≥ δF (x)u (x, l) + δ (1− F (x))u (x, l) .
Thus,
(1− δ)u (x, l) ≥ δF (x) [u (x, l)− u (x, l)] ≥ 0.
Therefore, as limδ→1 (1− δ)u (x, l) = 0 it must be that either
1. limδ→1 F (x) = 0, or
2. limδ→1 u (x, l)− u (x, l) = 0.
Similarly, using u (x, r) = δUr we obtain
(1− δ)u (x, r) ≥ δ (1− F (x)) [u (x, r)− u (x, r)] ≥ 0.
Again, as limδ→1 (1− δ)u (x, r) = 0 it must be that either
3. limδ→1 F (x) = 1, or
4. limδ→1 u (x, r)− u (x, r) = 0.
In case that (2) and (4) occur, it is immediate that it must be that limδ→1 x = limδ→1 x.
If (1) occurs then limδ→1 x = 0 and therefore limδ→1
∫ x
0
u (z, l) dF (z)−F (x)u (x, l) =
0, implying that limδ→1 x = 0 since otherwise, as l ∈ [0, x] and u (x, l) ≤ u (x, l), single-
peakedness would imply that
∫ x
0
u (z, l) dF (z) > F (x)u (x, l).
Similarly (3), implies that limδ→1 x = 1.
Step 3. If u (x, l) = δUl, u (x, r) = δUr and l = r, then the approval set converges to
a singleton as δ → 1.
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In this case, it must be that u (x, l) = u (x, l). Thus,
u (x, l) = δF (x)u (x, l) + δ
∫ x
x
u (z, l) dF (z) + δ (1− F (x))u (x, l) ,
or equivalently,
u (x, l) (1− δ) = δ
∫ x
x
u (z, l) dF (z)− δ [F (x)− F (x)]u (x, l) .
Therefore, as limδ→1 u (x, l) (1− δ) = 0, we must have
lim
δ→1
δ
∫ x
x
[u (z, l)− u (x, l)] dF (z) = 0
By single-peakedness, u (z, l) > u (x, l) for all z ∈ (x, x). Thus, we must have limδ→1 x−
x = 0.
Lemma 14 Fix δ and q and let [x, x] be the approval set. Let K (x) ≡ F (x) u
+
x (x, l)
u (x, l)
+
[1− F (x)] u
−
x (x, r)
u (x, r)
.
1. If there is an x∗ such that K (x∗) = 0,then x∗ is unique and x∗ ∈ [x, x].
2. Otherwise, there exist a unique i∗ ∈ I ∩ [l(q), r(q)] such that K(x) > 0 for x ∈
[l(q), i∗) and K(x) < 0 for x ∈ [i∗, r(q)], and i∗ ∈ [x, x].
Proof. First, note that the concavity of u implies that K is decreasing in x. Furthermore,
K (z) > 0 for all z < l and K (z) < 0 for all z > r. Therefore, K (x) = 0 admits at most
one solution in [l, r]. Otherwise, K changes sign once, and this must occur at a point
where F jumps, i.e. I is finite and the jump takes place at a unique i ∈ I ∩ [l, r].
We next claim that K (x) > 0 and K (x) < 0. Recall that xe denotes the expected
value the equilibrium outcome,
xe = F (x)x+
∫ x
x
zdF (z) + (1− F (x))x,
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and let xcr and x
c
l denote the certainty equivalents for the equilibrium for players r and l,
respectively, that is
u (xcl , l) = F (x)u (x, l) +
∫ x
x
u (z, l) dF (z) + (1− F (x))u (x, l) ,
u (xcr, r) = F (x)u (x, r) +
∫ x
x
u (z, r) dF (z) + (1− F (x))u (x, r) .
Note that the following inequalities are satisfied: x < xcr ≤ xe ≤ xcl < x. By the
equilibrium condition u (x, r) = δu (xcr, r), and by concavity
u (xcr, r)− u (x, r)
xcr − x
=
(1− δ)u (xcr, r)
xcr − x
≤ u−x (x, r) ,
and also, by concavity,
(1− δ)u (xe, r)
xe − x ≤
(1− δ)u (xcr, r)
xcr − x
Hence, as u (x, r) < u (xe, r) we obtain
(1− δ)u (x, r)
xe − x < u
−
x (x, r) . (9)
On the other hand, u (x, l) = δu (xcl , l) and concavity imply
u (xcl , l)− u (x, l)
xcl − x
=
(1− δ)u (xcl , l)
xcl − x
≤ u+x (x, l)
and, by concavity again (noting that u (xcl , l) ≤ u (xe, l)), 1)
(1− δ)u (xe, l)
xe − x ≤
(1− δ)u (xcl , l)
xcl − x
and therefore, since u (xe, l) < u (x, l) and xe − x < 0, we obtain
(1− δ)u (x, l)
xe − x < u
+
x (x, l) . (10)
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Thus,
(1− δ)K (x) = F (x) u
+
x (x, l)
(1− δ)u (x, l) + [1− F (x)]
u−x (x, r)
(1− δ)u (x, r) =
> F (x)
1
xe − x + [1− F (x)]
1
xe − x =
=
1
(xe − x) (xe − x) (F (x) (x
e − x) + [1− F (x)] (xe − x))
=
1
(xe − x) (xe − x) (F (x) (x− x) + (x
e − x))
Since xe < F (x)x+ (1− F (x))x, we have
F (x) (x− x) + (xe − x) < 0.
Thus, as (xe − x) (xe − x) < 0 we obtain
(1− δ)K (x) > 0.
Similarly, it can be shown that K (x) < 0.
Therefore since K is decreasing, if K(x) = 0 has a unique solution x∗, then x < x∗ < x.
For i∗ ∈ I ∩ [l, r] such that K(i∗− ) > 0 for all  > 0 and K(i∗) < 0, then x < i∗ ≤ x .
Lemma 15 ζ (x, l) is increasing in l, and ζ (x, r) is increasing in r.
Proof. Fix x and consider ζ (x, l) at two possible values of l = a, b with a < b. Notice
that ζ (x, a) < 1 implies u
(
ζ (x, a) , a
)
= δUa. In this case, if ζ (x, b) = 1 the result
follows. Otherwise, ζ (x, b) is defined by u
(
ζ (x, b) , b
)
= δUb. Moreover, by Lemma 11(2),
u
(
ζ (x, b) , a
)
> δUa. Thus, u
(
ζ (x, b) , a
)
> u
(
ζ (x, a) , a
)
. Moreover, as ζ (x, b) > b > a
we have that ζ (x, a) < ζ (x, b). In case that x = ζ (x, a) = 1, it must be that u (1, a) ≥
δUa. Therefore, by Lemma 11 (4), u (1, b) > δUb so that ζ (x, b) = 1.
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